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Explaining Charter School Effectiveness†
By Joshua D. Angrist, Parag A. Pathak, and Christopher R. Walters*
Lottery estimates suggest Massachusetts’ urban charter schools boost 
achievement well beyond that of traditional urban public schools stu-
dents, while nonurban charters reduce achievement from a higher 
baseline. The fact that urban charters are most effective for poor 
nonwhites and low-baseline achievers contributes to, but does not 
fully explain, these differences. We therefore link school-level charter 
impacts to school inputs and practices. The relative efficacy of urban 
lottery sample charters is accounted for by these schools’ embrace of 
the No Excuses approach to urban education. In our Massachusetts 
sample, Non-No-Excuses urban charters are no more effective than 
nonurban charters. (JEL H75, I21, I28)
A growing body of evidence suggests that urban charter schools have the poten-tial to generate impressive achievement gains, especially for minority students 
living in high-poverty areas. In a series of studies using admissions lotteries to iden-
tify causal effects, we looked at the impact of charter attendance in Boston and at a 
Knowledge is Power Program (KIPP) school in Lynn, Massachusetts (Abdulkadiro ˘    glu 
et al. 2009, 2011; Angrist et al. 2010, 2012). Boston and Lynn charter middle schools 
increase student achievement by about 0.4 standard deviations (σ) per year in math 
and about 0.2σ per year in English Language Arts (ELA). Among high school stu-
dents, attendance at a Boston charter school increases student achievement by about 
0.3σ per year in math and 0.2σ per year in ELA. Lottery studies of charter schools 
in the Harlem Children’s Zone (Dobbie and Fryer 2011a) and a Washington, DC 
charter boarding school (Curto and Fryer 2011) find similarly large gains. Studies 
of Chicago and New York charter schools also report positive effects (Hoxby and 
Rockoff 2004; Hoxby, Murarka, and Kang 2009; Dobbie and Fryer 2011b).
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While these results are encouraging, they come from schools operating in tradi-
tional (for charters) urban settings. Interest in charter schools is growing rapidly in 
school districts outside central cities (see, e.g., Hu 2011), but results for more diverse 
sets of charter schools are also more mixed. In a recent report evaluating roughly 
two dozen Massachusetts charter schools from around the state, we find little evi-
dence of achievement gains at schools outside of high-poverty urban areas (Angrist, 
Pathak, and Walters 2011). Some of the estimates for nonurban Massachusetts char-
ters show significant negative effects. These results echo findings from a multi-state 
study of 36 charter middle schools using admissions lotteries (Gleason et al. 2010).1 
Here too, charter schools outside of urban areas seem to do little for achievement, 
though, as in our earlier work, urban schools with high-minority, high-poverty 
enrollment generate some gains.2
This paper documents treatment effect heterogeneity in a large sample of 
Massachusetts charter schools and develops a framework for interpreting this hetero-
geneity using both student- and school-level explanatory variables. We begin with 
a semiparametric investigation of potential outcomes that assigns a role to variation 
in no-treatment counterfactuals and to charter applicants’ demographic characteris-
tics and baseline achievement. This investigation includes a Blinder (1973)-Oaxaca 
(1973) decomposition of the urban charter advantage. The resulting estimates show 
that students at urban charters are typical of the urban student population, and that 
urban charter attendance boosts achievement well beyond ambient noncharter lev-
els. Student demographics and baseline scores play a role in this—urban schools 
are most effective for minority students and students with low baseline scores—but 
nonurban charters appear to be ineffective for most subgroups.
We then investigate school-level factors that might explain differences in charter 
school effectiveness. This investigation is built on a set of nonlottery estimates that 
rely on statistical controls to eliminate selection bias. The observational analysis 
suggests that the sample of urban schools for which a lottery-based analysis is fea-
sible, that is, oversubscribed schools with good lottery records, boost scores more 
than other urban charter schools. We show that urban and lottery-sample charter 
effectiveness can be explained by adherence to a No Excuses approach to urban 
education that emphasizes discipline and comportment, traditional reading and 
math skills, instruction time, and selective teacher hiring. Using a detailed survey of 
school practices and characteristics, we document the practices most characteristic 
of No Excuses schools. Relative to other Massachusetts charter schools, No Excuses 
schools are more likely to feature strict discipline, uniforms, and cold-calling, to 
employ alumni of the Teach for America (TFA) program, and to videotape lessons 
for teacher feedback. Conditional on No Excuses status, traditional inputs, such as 
time in school and per-pupil expenditure, are not predictive of charter effectiveness.
1 Other studies documenting heterogeneity in the effects of charter schools include Hoxby (2004), Zimmer et al. 
(2009), and Imberman (2011). The Imberman study reports that urban charter school start-ups have large effects on 
discipline and attendance, while converted schools do not.
2 A focus on differences between urban and nonurban schools also appears in research on Catholic schools. 
Evans and Schwab (1995) and Neal (1997) show that Catholic school attendance leads to increases in high school 
graduation and college attendance for cohorts graduating in the early 1980s. Both studies find larger benefits for 
black students and for students in urban settings. Grogger and Neal (2000) and Altonji, Elder, and Taber (2005) 
report similar findings for more recent cohorts.
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The results reported here contribute to a growing body of evidence documenting 
the effectiveness of No Excuses practices in various contexts. Dobbie and Fryer 
(2011b) show that an index measuring teacher feedback, data-driven instruction, 
tutoring, increased instruction time, and high expectations is a significant predictor 
of effectiveness in a sample of New York charter schools. These practices are typi-
cally understood to be central elements of the No Excuses model (Thernstrom and 
Thernstrom 2003; Carter 2000), and are highly correlated with No Excuses status 
in our sample. Similarly, Fryer (2011) reports on an experiment implementing No 
Excuses strategies in nine low-performing traditional public schools in Houston. 
This intervention appears to have produced substantial gains, suggesting that the No 
Excuses model may be effective beyond the charter context.
The following section details school participation in this study, describes our 
data, and outlines our empirical strategy for the lottery analysis. Section III pres-
ents the findings that motivate our investigation of charter effect heterogeneity. 
Section IV outlines the econometric framework used to investigate this heterogene-
ity and reports the results of this investigation. Section V discusses our observational 
analysis of the connection between charter effectiveness and school practices.
I. Lottery Analysis: Data and Empirical Strategy
A. lottery and Survey Data
We attempted to collect lottery data for the set of Massachusetts charter schools 
serving middle and high school grades and meeting a set of prespecified eligibility 
criteria. The school-selection process is detailed in Table 1. Schools eligible for our 
study accept students in the relevant entry grades (grades 4–7 for middle school and 
grade 9 for high school). Excluded are closed schools, schools that opened after 
the 2009–2010 school year, and schools serving nontraditional populations (usually 
students at risk of dropping out). The resulting sample includes 28 of the 34 charters 
with middle school entry grades and 8 of 16 schools with high school entry grades.3 
Eligible schools omitted from the lottery analysis were either undersubscribed or 
failed to keep lottery records adequate for our study. The final sample of oversub-
scribed schools with usable records includes 17 middle schools and 6 high schools. 
These schools are listed in online Appendix Table A1. The lottery sample includes 
nine urban middle schools, eight nonurban middle schools, four urban high schools, 
and two nonurban high schools.4
In an effort to document differences in school practice, we surveyed the full 
set of eligible charter schools, regardless of the quality of their lottery records. 
 Twenty-four school administrators completed this survey.5 The survey is described 
in detail in the online Survey Appendix. As shown in panel A of Table 2, the survey 
3 Three eligible schools serve both middle and high school grades, so there are 33 eligible campuses. Schools 
are classified as both middle and high if they have entrance lotteries at both levels, or if lottery records at the middle 
school level were available early enough for participants to be observed in high school.
4 Urban areas are those in which the district superintendent participates in the Massachusetts Urban Superintendents 
Network. This defines a sample split essentially identical to that based on high poverty or high minority enrollment.
5 This generates data for 27 schools since three admit in both middle and high school.
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reveals  important differences between urban and nonurban charter schools. Urban 
schools are younger than nonurban schools. In spring 2010, the average urban school 
had been open for 8.6 years, while the average nonurban school had been open for 
12.4 years. Urban charter schools also run a longer school day and year than do non-
urban schools. The average urban charter year lasts 189 days and has a school day of 
471 minutes, compared to 183 days and 440 minutes at nonurban schools. The extra 
time appears to go to increased math and reading instruction. Urban schools spend 
27 extra minutes per day on math and 39 extra minutes per day on reading. In addi-
tion, 19 percent of urban charter schools have Saturday school, while no nonurban 
charter reported having school on Saturday.
Urban and nonurban schools also differ with respect to school philosophy. 
The survey results reveal a particularly sharp division between urban and nonur-
ban charters with respect to the No Excuses approach to education. As discussed 
by Thernstrom and Thernstrom (2003) and Carter (2000), No Excuses principles 
include an emphasis on student behavior and comportment, extended time in school, 
an intensive focus on traditional reading and math skills, and teacher quality. Two-
thirds of urban charter administrators identify somewhat or fully with No Excuses 
pedagogy, while no nonurban charter identifies with this approach. We provide fur-
ther details on differences in school practice in Section V.
Panel B of Table 2 compares the inputs and resources used by urban charters, 
nonurban charters, and traditional public schools.6 All urban charters qualify for 
Federal Title I funds. Urban charters spend about as much as traditional public 
schools, while nonurban charter schools spend less ($13,668 compared to $11,091). 
Compared to nonurban charters and public schools, urban charters have  substantially 
younger teachers. Probably due to these age differences, urban charter teachers are 
6 Characteristics of traditional public schools were gathered from http://profiles.doe.mass.edu and refer to the 
2010–2011 school year. Our survey measures are unavailable for traditional public schools.
Table 1—School Participation
School level Urban status Boston status 
Middle (entry
in 4–7) and
high (entry in 9)
school charters
(1)
Charters
eligible for
lottery study
(2)
Charters
included in
lottery study
(3)
Middle Urban 22 17 9
Boston 12 9 7
Non-Boston 10 8 2
Nonurban 12 11 8
Total (urban and nonurban) 34 28 17
High Urban 12 6 4
Boston 8 5 4
Non-Boston 4 1 0
Nonurban 4 2 2
Total (urban and nonurban) 16 8 6
Notes: This table reports the number of middle and high charter schools in Massachusetts and their participation in 
the observational and lottery studies. Urban towns include: Boston, Brockton, Cambridge, Chelsea, Chicopee, Everett, 
Fall River, Fitchburg, Framingham, Haverhill, Holyoke, Lawrence, Leominster, Lowell, Lynn, Malden, New Bedford, 
Pittsfield, Quincy, Revere, Somerville, Springfield, Taunton, and Worcester. Three schools with lotteries at the middle 
school entry point which also enroll students in the high school grades are included in the high school sample.
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less likely to be licensed than traditional public school teachers. Student/teacher 
ratios at charter schools are generally smaller than staff ratios at traditional public 
schools; nonurban charter schools have the smallest classes.
B. student data
The student-level data used here come from administrative records covering all 
public schools in Massachusetts.7 Our sample covers the 2001–2002 school year 
through the 2010–2011 school year. The administrative records include information 
on demographics and school(s) attended, as well as Massachusetts Comprehensive 
Assessment System (MCAS) scores. The MCAS is a set of  high-stakes  standardized 
tests given to students in grades 3–8 and grade 10. The primary outcomes analyzed 
in our study are math and English Language Arts (ELA) scores. The online Data 
Appendix provides details on the availability of outcomes for each applicant cohort. 
Raw MCAS scores were standardized by subject, grade level, and year.
The lottery analysis sample matches applicant records to administrative data 
using applicants’ names, cohorts, and grades. Where available, information on 
date of birth, town of residence, race/ethnicity, and gender was used to break ties. 
7 Records are from the Student Information Management System, or SIMS. See the online Data Appendix for 
details.
Table 2—Characteristics of Charter and Public Schools
All 
charters 
Urban 
charters 
Nonurban 
charters 
Traditional 
public schools
(1) (2) (3) (4)
panel A. charter school characteristics
Years open 10.1 8.6 12.4 —
Days per year 186 189 183 —
Average minutes per day 463 471 440 —
Saturday school 0.14 0.19 0.00 —
Average math instruction (min) 91 97 70 —
Average reading instruction (min) 84 91 52 —
No excuses 0.41 0.67 0.00 —
panel B. comparison with traditional public schools
Proportion of teachers 32 and younger 0.56 0.70 0.33 0.20
Proportion of teachers 49 and older 0.17 0.08 0.31 0.42
Proportion of teachers licensed to teach assignment 0.64 0.62 0.67 0.98
Proportion of core classes taught by highly qualified teachers 0.94 0.92 0.98 0.98
Student/teacher ratio 12.0 12.6 11.1 15.2
Average per-pupil expenditure $12,618 $13,668 $11,091 $13,047
Title I eligible 0.86 1.00 0.64 0.50
Observations (schools) 27 18 9 1,810
Notes: This table reports characteristics of Massachusetts charter and traditional schools. Charter school character-
istics come from a survey of school administrators. Panel B compares charter schools to traditional public schools 
using data from state school profiles. Column 1 reports results from our statewide sample of charter schools with entry 
in middle (4th–7th) or high school (9th) grades. The charter sample excludes schools closed prior to Spring 2011, 
schools that opened after Spring 2010, and schools serving nontraditional student populations. Columns 2 and 3 show 
results for the urban and nonurban charter subsamples. Column 4 reports teacher characteristics for all traditional 
public schools in Massachusetts. Highly qualified teachers are teachers that possess a Massachusetts teaching license 
and demonstrate subject matter competency, either by passing a subject test or meeting one of several other criteria.
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Ninety-two percent of applicants were matched. Applicants were excluded from the 
lottery analysis if they were disqualified from the lottery they entered (this mostly 
affected applicants to the wrong grade level). We also dropped siblings of current 
students, late applicants, and some out-of-area applicants.8 Students missing base-
line demographic information in the state database were dropped as well.
C. descriptive statistics
We begin with a statistical picture of the Massachusetts student population in 
traditional public and charter schools, presented in Table 3 separately for urban and 
nonurban areas. Traditional schools are defined as those that are not charters, alter-
native programs for older students, exclusively special education, exam, or magnet 
schools. The table shows average demographic characteristics, participation rates 
in limited English proficiency (LEP) and special education (SPED) programs, and 
average baseline test scores. Baseline (pre-charter enrollment) scores are from 
grade 4 for middle school and grade 8 for high school.
Traditional urban students are unlike traditional students in the rest of the state. 
Specifically, urban students are more likely to be black or Hispanic, to participate in 
LEP or SPED programs, and to receive a subsidized lunch. Urban students also have 
much lower baseline test scores than other public school students, with scores 0.43σ 
and 0.47σ below the state average in math and ELA at the middle school level, and 
0.42σ and 0.39σ below the average for high school. In contrast, nonurban students 
score 0.21σ and 0.23σ above the middle school average; the corresponding nonur-
ban advantages in high school are 0.27σ and 0.28σ.
Eligible charter school students who live in urban and nonurban areas are more 
similar to their peers in regular public schools than to one another. On the other hand, 
we see important differences by charter status as well. Urban charter schools serve a 
higher proportion of black students than do urban public schools. Urban charter stu-
dents are also less likely to participate in LEP or SPED programs, or to qualify for a 
subsidized lunch. Charter school students in both urban and nonurban areas have base-
line test scores that are slightly higher than those of their public school counterparts. 
In samples from both urban and nonurban areas, charter applicants for whom we have 
lottery data appear similar to the corresponding samples of all charter students.
D. empirical strategy
Our lottery-based identification strategy captures causal effects for applicants to 
over-subscribed charters with high-quality lottery records. The second-stage equa-
tion for the lottery analysis is
(1)   y igt =  α 2t +  β 2g +  ∑ 
j
 
 
 δ j  d ij +  X i ′ θ + τ  s igt +  ϵ igt ,
8 Charter schools typically give priority to sibling applicants, as well as to students in the local school district or 
region. Our applicant risk sets (discussed in the next section) distinguish between in-area and out-of-area applicants 
for schools that take substantial numbers of both. Out-of-area applicants were dropped at schools with fewer than 
five in this category.
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where  y igt is a test score for student i in grade g in year t,  α 2t and  β 2g are year 
and grade effects,  X i is a vector of pre-lottery demographic characteristics (sex, race, special education, limited English proficiency, subsidized lunch sta-
tus, and a  female-minority interaction term), and  ϵ igt is an error term. The 
set of  d ij includes a separate dummy variable for every combination of char-
ter school lotteries applied to by applicants in the lottery sample. In what fol-
lows, we refer to these combinations as “risk sets.” (Lottery offers are randomly 
assigned within risk sets but not unconditionally.) Our treatment variable,  s igt , 
measures years spent in charter schools between application and test dates.9
Ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates of τ in equation (1) fail to capture causal 
effects if the decision to apply to or attend a charter school is correlated with unmea-
sured ability, motivation, or family background. We therefore use a dummy variable, 
9 Students who transfer between public schools are assigned to the school attended longest in a given year. 
Students with any charter attendance are coding as having been in charter for the year. Students attending multiple 
charters in a given year are coded as having been a student at the charter school attended longest. The variable  s igt 
counts years spent at any charter school, including those without lottery records.
Table 3—Descriptive Statistics for Students
Traditional public 
school students
Charter
students
Charter lottery 
applicants
Urban Nonurban Urban Nonurban Urban Nonurban
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
panel A. Middle schools (5th–8th grade)
Female 0.486 0.488 0.501 0.478 0.496 0.509
Black 0.183 0.027 0.381 0.035 0.479 0.022
Hispanic 0.319 0.038 0.246 0.039 0.233 0.025
Special education 0.191 0.165 0.167 0.158 0.176 0.185
Subsidized lunch 0.687 0.146 0.642 0.211 0.686 0.103
Limited English proficiency 0.160 0.017 0.082 0.022 0.085 0.008
Baseline math score −0.427 0.210 −0.322 0.259 −0.356 0.305
Baseline ELA score −0.466 0.232 −0.312 0.275 −0.375 0.391
Years in charter 0.00 0.00 2.09 1.97 1.59 1.25
Observations (students) 171,703 415,794 8,388 9,070 4,155 1,701
Observations (schools) 262 400 17 11 9 8
panel B. High schools (10th grade)
Female 0.499 0.494 0.557 0.545 0.548 0.538
Black 0.189 0.028 0.527 0.021 0.614 0.028
Hispanic 0.275 0.034 0.183 0.010 0.257 0.017
Special education 0.172 0.156 0.166 0.109 0.178 0.114
Subsidized lunch 0.612 0.126 0.608 0.146 0.717 0.123
Limited English proficiency 0.094 0.009 0.024 0.004 0.035 0.003
Baseline math score −0.420 0.268 −0.371 0.321 −0.320 0.440
Baseline ELA score −0.392 0.278 −0.318 0.412 −0.315 0.552
Years in charter 0.00 0.00 1.77 1.81 0.64 1.30
Observations (students) 132,774 357,733 2,676 909 3,029 351
Observations (schools) 104 316 6 2 4 2
Notes: This table reports descriptive statistics for the sample of public school students (columns 1 and 2), the sam-
ple of students in charter schools eligible for the study (columns 3 and 4), and our lottery sample of charter appli-
cants (columns 5 and 6) from 2002–2011. All samples include only students in Massachusetts public schools at 
baseline with at least one followup test score. The number of schools in columns 1 and 2 is counted in sixth grade 
for middle school and tenth grade for high school. Years in charter school is measured as time spent in eligible char-
ter schools through eighth grade for middle school and tenth grade for high school.
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Z i , indicating lottery offers as an instrumental variable for time spent in charter 
school. The first stage for this two-stage least squares (2SLS) procedure is
(2)   s igt =  α 1t +  β 1g +  ∑ 
j
 
 
 κ j  d ij +  X i ′μ + π  Z i +  η igt ,
where π is the effect of a lottery offer on charter attendance. As in the second-stage 
equation, the first stage includes risk set controls and baseline demographic charac-
teristics, as well as year and grade effects. Estimates for high school applicants are 
for grade 10 MCAS scores, with standard errors clustered by school/grade/year. 
Samples for middle school include all non-repeat, post-lottery test scores through 
grade 8 and add a second layer of clustering at the student level.
The online Appendix presents evidence in support of the lottery-based identifi-
cation strategy. Specifically, Table A2 shows that conditional on risk set, winning 
the lottery is uncorrelated with student characteristics. Online Appendix Table A3 
shows that MCAS outcomes scores are available for roughly 90 percent of middle 
school applicants and 75 percent of high school applicants. Score availability is two 
points higher for lottery winners than losers in the middle school sample, but this 
small imbalance is unlikely to be important for the estimates discussed below.10
Differences in effectiveness between urban and nonurban charter schools are a 
primary focus of our analysis. Area-specific 2SLS estimates of charter effectiveness 
were constructed using equations of the form
(3)   y igt =  α 2t +  β 2g +  ∑ 
j
 
 
 δ j  d ij +  X i ′ θ +  τ u  s igt u +  τ n  s igt n +  ϵ igt ,
where  s igt u and  s igt n are years in urban and nonurban charter schools. The first stage for 
urban charter attendance can be written
( 4)   s igt u =  α 1t +  β 1g +  ∑ 
j
 
 
 κ j  d ij +  X i ′μ +  π u  Z i u +  π n  Z i n +  η igt ,
where  Z i u and  Z i n indicate offers from urban and nonurban charters, with a similar 
specification for nonurban charter attendance.
II. Lottery Estimates
The first-stage estimates reported in column 1 of Table 4 show that, among appli-
cants to charter middle schools, students who won a charter school lottery spent 
about one year more in a charter before being tested than did students who were not 
offered a seat. Applicants who won high school entrance lotteries spent a little over 
half a year longer in a charter school between application and testing than applicants 
who lost. These first-stage estimates are similar to those reported in Abdulkadiro ˘    glu 
et al. (2011) for a smaller sample of charter schools in Boston.
10 Online Table A2 shows that lottery offers are uncorrelated with student characteristics in both urban and  nonurban 
areas. Columns 3 and 5 of online Table A3 show that follow-up rates are similar for urban and nonurban charters. 
Differences in follow-up rates between winners and losers are slightly higher for nonurban schools at both levels.
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Second stage estimates for the full sample of lottery schools appear in column 2 
of Table 4. These imply that a year of attendance at a lottery sample charter middle 
school increases math scores by 0.21σ and ELA scores by 0.08σ. The high school 
2SLS estimates reveal larger causal effects, with score gains on the order of 0.27σ 
per year for math and 0.21σ per year for ELA.11
Estimates for the full state sample mask considerable heterogeneity by urban sta-
tus, a pattern documented in columns 3 through 6 of Table 4. Although first stages 
at urban and nonurban middle schools are similar, the corresponding second-stage 
estimates differ markedly. 2SLS estimates for urban middle schools, reported in col-
umn 4 of Table 4, suggest these schools generate gains of 0.32σ in math and 0.15σ 
in ELA per year enrolled. In contrast, estimates for nonurban charter middle schools 
are negative. In particular, as can be seen in column 6, charter students at nonurban 
middle schools appear to lose ground relative to their public school peers at a rate 
of 0.12σ per year in math and 0.14σ per year in ELA. Not surprisingly, high school 
lottery results for urban schools are similar to the statewide results (since only two 
of the high schools in the state sample are nonurban), showing large gains in math 
11 Our earlier working paper reports results for writing scores similar to those for ELA (Angrist, Pathak, and 
Walters 2011).
Table 4—Lottery Estimates of Charter Effects
All charter schools Urban charter schools Nonurban charter schools
First stage 2SLS First stage 2SLS First stage 2SLS
Subject (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
panel A. Middle school
Math 1.02*** 0.213*** 1.03*** 0.321*** 1.01*** −0.123***
(0.040) (0.028) (0.051) (0.031) (0.074) (0.047)
N 16,543 11,941 4,602
ELA 1.02*** 0.075*** 1.04*** 0.146*** 1.00*** −0.144***
(0.040) (0.025) (0.051) (0.028) (0.074) (0.039)
N 16,285 11,649 4,636
panel B. High school
Math 0.565*** 0.273*** 0.508*** 0.339*** 1.13*** −0.020
(0.085) (0.071) (0.090) (0.077) (0.197) (0.071)
N 4,050 3,519 531
ELA 0.565*** 0.206*** 0.508*** 0.264*** 1.14*** −0.046
(0.086) (0.060) (0.090) (0.067) (0.196) (0.059)
N 4,103 3,567 536
Notes: This table reports 2SLS estimates of the effects of time spent in charter schools on test scores. The endog-
enous variable is years spent in charter schools and the instrument is a lottery offer dummy. Columns 1–2 show 
estimates for all schools, columns 3–4 show estimates for urban charter schools, and columns 5–6 show estimates 
for nonurban schools. The urban and nonurban estimates for a given subject come from a single regression with 
two endogenous variables, using urban and nonurban offers as instruments. All models control for race, sex, special 
education, limited English proficiency, subsidized lunch status, and a female by minority dummy. Year of birth, year 
of test, and risk set dummies are also included. Estimates for the middle school sample pool post-lottery outcomes 
for grades 4–8 and cluster by student identifier as well as school-grade-year. Estimates for the high school sample 
include only scores for tenth grade and cluster by school-grade-year.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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and ELA.12 On the other hand, 2SLS estimates for nonurban charter high schools 
are small, negative, and not significantly different from zero.13
Variation in charter effects across demographic groups is documented in Table 5, 
separately for urban and nonurban schools. Urban charter schools boost scores for 
most applicants, though not uniformly. Girls realize slightly larger gains in math, 
while boys see slightly larger ELA gains. Black and Hispanic students benefit consid-
erably from urban charter attendance in middle school, but the estimated math gains 
for whites are smaller, with no increase in whites’ ELA scores. Urban charter middle 
schools appear to produce especially large achievement gains for students eligible for 
a subsidized lunch and for those with low baseline scores. Attendance at urban charter 
high schools increases math scores in every group and raises reading scores for every-
one except whites, though estimates for small groups are imprecise.
Nonurban charter attendance fails to raise scores for most of the groups examined in 
Table 5, and appears to reduce achievement for girls, whites, and students with low base-
line scores in middle school. Estimates for nonurban black and Hispanic middle school 
students are negative, though not significantly different from zero. Most of the estimates 
for nonurban charter high school students are close to zero, though effects here are less 
precisely estimated than those for nonurban middle school (high school estimates for 
blacks and Hispanics are omitted due to the small size of these nonurban groups).14
III. Differences in Students
We investigate student- and school-level explanations for the striking difference 
in achievement effects at urban and nonurban charter schools. The student-level 
analysis is cast in a semiparametric framework with heterogeneous potential out-
comes, indexed against a Bernoulli treatment,  d i ∈ {0, 1}, to indicate charter 
attendance. The Bernoulli setup focuses on heterogeneity, while abstracting from 
nonlinearities that seem second-order in this context (the first stage effects of lottery 
offers are similar in the two settings for middle school, yet the corresponding second 
stage estimates differ dramatically). Let  Y 1i and  Y 0i denote potential test scores for 
student i in and out of charter school. The observed outcome for student i is
   Y i =  Y 0i + ( Y 1i −  Y 0i )  d i .
In other words, we observe  Y 0i for applicants who don’t go to charter school and  Y 1i 
for those who do.
12 We also looked at the effects of charter attendance on high school graduation rates. Online Appendix Table A4 
shows 2SLS estimates of equations (1) and (3) for graduation, with the endogenous variable coded as a dummy for 
attending a charter in the year after the lottery. This analysis suggests that attending a charter has little effect on the 
probability of high school graduation.
13 As shown in columns 3 and 5 of Table 4, the first stage for urban high schools is smaller than the first stage for 
nonurban high schools. This difference reflects the fact that a larger proportion of the nonurban high school sample 
comes from entrance lotteries in middle grades, generating more potential years of charter exposure by the time 
applicants were tested in high school.
14 Clustering the nonurban high school standard errors by school-grade-year as in Table 4 produced standard 
errors that were much smaller than classical homoskedastic 2SLS standard errors, suggesting  finite-sample bias due 
to clustering. To avoid this bias, we report p-values from 1,000 replications of the wild cluster bootstrap percentile-t 
procedure described by Cameron, Gelbach, and Miller (2008).
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Our empirical work uses data from many school- and cohort-specific admissions 
lotteries, but the the theory behind our heterogeneity analysis is detailed with refer-
ence to a single lottery. Offers in this lottery are indicated by  Z i , as before. Potential 
treatment assignments, denoted  d 1i and  d 0i , tell us whether student i attends a char-
ter school if he wins or loses the lottery. Offers are randomly assigned and assumed 
to affect test scores only through charter attendance, so the potential outcome vector 
( Y 1i ,  Y 0i ,  d 1i ,  d 0i ) is independent of  Z i . We also assume that winning an entrance 
lottery can only make charter attendance more likely, so that  d 1i ≥  d 0i ∀i, with 
strict inequality for some students.
Table 5—Lottery Estimates for Subgroups
Sex Race
Subsidized 
lunch 
(5)
Lowest 
baseline 
quartile 
(6)
School 
level Subject 
Female 
(1)
Male 
(2)
Black/
Hispanic 
(3)
White 
(4)
panel A. urban schools
Middle Math 0.379*** 0.276*** 0.421*** 0.133** 0.348*** 0.388***
(0.042) (0.041) (0.040) (0.054) (0.036) (0.055)
N 5,994 5,947 8,415 2,583 8,182 2,869
ELA 0.124*** 0.173*** 0.211*** 0.034 0.182*** 0.279***
(0.037) (0.040) (0.037) (0.047) (0.033) (0.057)
N 5,852 5,797 8,176 2,537 7,992 2,840
High Math 0.368*** 0.319*** 0.378*** 0.168 0.348*** 0.444***
(0.087) (0.105) (0.074) (0.235) (0.080) (0.104)
N 1,928 1,591 3,018 310 2,521 811
ELA 0.236*** 0.279*** 0.325*** −0.063 0.275*** 0.251**
(0.077) (0.095) (0.067) (0.221) (0.071) (0.123)
N 1,955 1,612 3,061 311 2,557 768
panel B. Nonurban schools
Middle Math −0.159*** −0.084 −0.230 −0.115** −0.128 −0.159**
(0.060) (0.070) (0.285) (0.045) (0.127) (0.071)
N 2,332 2,270 236 4,135 456 1,072
ELA −0.169*** −0.114* −0.241 −0.150*** −0.119 −0.188**
(0.049) (0.060) (0.251) (0.040) (0.099) (0.076)
N 2,348 2,288 237 4,169 466 1,134
High Math 0.005 0.052 — 0.039 0.427 −0.097
[0.959] [0.670] [0.627] [0.389] [0.438]
N 281 250 494 68 119
ELA 0.034 −0.062 — −0.028 −0.392 0.054
[0.717] [0.382] [0.559] [0.368] [0.709]
N 281 255 496 71 123
Notes: This table reports 2SLS estimates of the effects of time spent in charter schools on demographic subgroups. 
All regressions include year dummies, grade dummies, risk set dummies, and demographic controls. Middle school 
standard errors are clustered on student identifier as well as school-grade-year. High school standard errors are clus-
tered by school-grade-year for urban schools. For nonurban high schools, numbers in brackets show p-values from 
1,000 replications of a wild bootstrap percentile-t procedure clustered on school-grade-year.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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Under these assumptions, instrumental variables estimation using  Z i as an instru-
ment for  d i in the sample of lottery applicants produces a local average treatment 
effect (LATE; Imbens and Angrist 1994). Here, LATE is the effect of charter atten-
dance for students induced to enroll in a charter school by winning an admissions 
lottery. This is the population of lottery compliers, who have  d 1i >  d 0i . When com-
puted separately for urban and nonurban students, IV estimates identify
   τ ℓ ≡   E ℓ [ Y i |  Z i = 1] −  E ℓ [ Y i |  Z i = 0]   ___
 E ℓ [ d i |  Z i = 1] −  E ℓ [ d i |  Z i = 0]  
 =  E ℓ [ Y 1i −  Y 0i |  d 1i >  d 0i ], ℓ ∈ {u, n};
where ℓ indexes location;  E ℓ denotes an expectation over students in location ℓ; and 
u and n indicate urban and nonurban locations, respectively. This is LATE for com-
pliers in each setting.
We pinpoint two sources of student-level heterogeneity that might contribute to 
the difference between  τ u and  τ n . The first is variation in  Y 0i across charter and non-
charter students within each area. This investigation tells us whether charter appli-
cants and/or charter lottery compliers are unusual in either setting, as measured by 
their public school achievement. Second, we use a Blinder (1973)-Oaxaca (1973) 
decomposition to separate the difference in charter effectiveness across areas into 
a component due to differences in student populations and a component due to dif-
ferences in effectiveness conditional on student characteristics. This analysis tells 
us how much of the urban charter advantage arises from the fact that urban charters 
serve groups especially likely to benefit from charter attendance.
A. potential-outcome Gaps in urban and Nonurban Areas
LATE can be split into two parts, the first capturing differences in potential out-
comes in the treated state (differences in  Y 1i ) and the second capturing differences 
in potential outcomes in the nontreated state (differences in  Y 0i ). Specifically, we 
benchmark achievement in each area using the local noncharter mean. This tells 
us whether the urban charter advantage is driven by unusually low nontreated 
outcomes for urban compliers, or whether compliers are, in fact, typical of their 
milieu. Figure 1 illustrates the alternative scenarios we have in mind. The left panel 
describes a situation in which the achievement of nontreated urban students is com-
parable to ambient noncharter achievement, while the right panel describes a situa-
tion in which the urban fallback is unusually low.
The econometric analysis of within-area counterfactuals begins with a decompo-
sition of urban and nonurban LATE as follows:
(5)   τ ℓ =  E ℓ [ Y 1i |  d 1i >  d 0i ] −  E ℓ [ Y 0i |  d i = 0] 5
  λ 1 ℓ
 −  ( E ℓ [ Y 0i |  d 1i >  d 0i ] −  E ℓ [ Y 0i |  d i = 0] ) , ℓ ∈ {u, n}. 
  λ 0 ℓ
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The term  λ 0 ℓ is the difference in average  Y 0i between lottery compliers and the gen-
eral population of noncharter students in the relevant area, while  λ 1 ℓ is the difference 
between the treated outcomes of compliers and ambient noncharter achievement. 
For example, large  λ 1 u and small  λ 0 u mean that urban charters push their students 
beyond typical noncharter achievement in cities.
Abadie (2002) shows that marginal mean  Y 0i for compliers is given by
(6)  E ℓ [ Y 0i |  d 1i >  d 0i ] =   E ℓ [ Y i · (1 −  d i )|  Z i = 1] −  E ℓ [ Y i · (1 −  d i )|  Z i = 0]     ____    E ℓ [1 −  d i |  Z i = 1] −  E ℓ [1 −  d i |  Z i = 0]  .
We estimate  λ 0 ℓ by constructing the empirical analogue of equation (6) for lottery 
applicants in the relevant location, and subtracting the mean score for all noncharter 
students including nonapplicants.  λ 1 ℓ is estimated using an analogous procedure that 
replaces (1 −  d i ) with  d i in equation (6).15
Estimates of  λ 0 ℓ and  λ 1 ℓ appear in Table 6. Columns 1–4 show results for urban 
schools. Column 2 reports the average  Y 0i for noncharter students, while column 3 
shows  λ 0 u, the difference in average nontreated outcomes between urban compliers 
and the scores of noncharter students. Estimates of  λ 1 u, the difference between the 
treated outcomes of urban compliers and the ambient level of urban achievement, 
appear in column 4.16 The estimates of  λ 0 u suggest that urban lottery compliers are 
positively selected from the urban middle school population, but the estimated gaps 
15 The simple Wald formula given here is valid for a single lottery. Combining data from multiple lotteries, we 
estimate marginal complier means via a 2SLS procedure with risk set fixed effects. This produces a weighted aver-
age of within-risk-set estimates (Angrist and Imbens 1995).
16 Middle school scores are from the year after the lottery for applicants and sixth grade for nonapplicants. High 
school scores are from tenth grade, as in earlier tables.
High Y1 Low Y0
Treatment effect
Treatment effect
Eu[Y1|D1 > D0]
Eu[Y0|D1 > D0]
Eu[Y0|D = 0]
Eu[Y1|D1 > D0]
Eu[Y0|D1 > D0]
Eu[Y0|D = 0]
λ1u
λ1uλ0u
λ0u
Figure 1. Two Types of Treatment Effects in Urban Areas
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are small, and (marginally) significant only for middle school ELA. Because urban 
charter compliers have noncharter achievement levels that are fairly typical of stu-
dents in urban areas, the large score gains generated by urban charter schools can be 
attributed to high scores in the treated state, a fact reflected by the large, significant 
estimates of  λ 1 u in column 4.
Columns 7 and 8 of Table 6 report estimates of  λ 0 n and  λ 1 n for students at nonurban 
charter schools. As in urban areas, the noncharter achievement level of nonurban 
middle school compliers is slightly higher than that of students in the surrounding 
public schools. The ELA scores of nonurban middle school compliers in public 
schools exceed the ambient nonurban achievement level by a statistically signif-
icant 0.10σ, while the estimate of  λ 1 n for ELA is a precisely estimated −0.09σ. 
This implies that nonurban charter middle schools move their students from atypi-
cally high ELA achievement levels to levels below those of nonurban public school 
students. Noncharter math achievement of nonurban middle school compliers is 
statistically indistinguishable from the ambient noncharter level, while nonurban 
charter attendance pulls compliers 0.14σ below the noncharter mean. The results 
for  nonurban high school students show more positive selection (high  λ 0 n) than in 
middle school. As can be seen by comparing columns 7 and 8 in panel B, charter 
Table 6—Potential-Outcome Gaps in Urban and Nonurban Areas
Urban Nonurban 
Treatment 
effect  E u [ Y 0 | d = 0]  λ 0 u  λ 1 u
Treatment 
effect  E n [ Y 0 | d = 0]  λ 0 n  λ 1 n
Subject (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
panel A. Middle school
Math 0.483*** −0.399*** 0.077 0.560*** −0.177** 0.236*** 0.010 −0.143***
(0.074) (0.011) (0.049) (0.054) (0.074) (0.007) (0.061) (0.042)
N 4,858 2,239
ELA 0.188*** −0.422*** 0.118** 0.306*** −0.148*** 0.260*** 0.102** −0.086***
(0.064) (0.012) (0.054) (0.049) (0.048) (0.007) (0.050) (0.030)
N 4,551 2,323
panel B. High school
Math 0.557*** −0.371*** 0.074 0.602*** 0.065 0.241*** 0.207 0.271***
(0.164) (0.021) (0.099) (0.151) (0.146) (0.008) (0.145) (0.041)
N 3,743 432
ELA 0.417*** −0.369*** −0.004 0.410*** 0.064 0.250*** 0.237 0.301***
(0.140) (0.018) (0.096) (0.119) (0.151) (0.008) (0.152) (0.051)
N 4,858 435
Notes: This table compares potential outcomes for compliers and traditional public school students. Outcomes are 
test scores in the year after the lottery for middle school lottery applicants and tenth grade scores for high school 
lottery applicants. For nonapplicants, outcomes are sixth grade scores in middle school, and tenth grade scores in 
high school. The treatment is a dummy for charter attendance. Columns 1 and 5 show 2SLS estimates of the effect 
of charter attendance on test scores in urban and nonurban areas, with the lottery offer dummy interacted with risk 
sets as instruments and risk set dummies as controls. Columns 2 and 6 shows average test scores for noncharter stu-
dents, including nonapplicants. Columns 3 and 7 show differences between the average noncharter scores of com-
pliers and the scores of noncharter students. Columns 4 and 8 show differences between the treated outcomes of 
compliers and the scores of noncharter students.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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attendance leaves nonurban high school students essentially unchanged from this 
higher starting point.
These results paint a consistent picture of the urban charter advantage. Urban 
middle school charters push the scores of their students from a typically low level up 
to a level much closer to the achievement level seen among nonurban students (the 
scenario sketched in the left panel of Figure 1). Nonurban charter middle schools 
reduce the scores of their students, in some cases markedly so. The corresponding 
results for high schools are like those for middle schools in that urban charter high 
schools push their students beyond the level of achievement typical of urban public 
high schools. Nonurban charter high schools leave scores unchanged from a higher 
noncharter counterfactual baseline.17
B. Accounting for student demographics
The role student demographics play in generating the urban charter advantage is 
explored with the help of a decomposition in the spirit of Blinder (1973) and Oaxaca 
(1973). For example, poor, minority students may benefit the most from charter 
attendance, and urban charters may be more effective than nonurban charters in part 
because they serve larger shares of such students. The Blinder-Oaxaca framework 
allows us to quantify the contribution of differences in student composition to the 
urban charter advantage.
The first step of our Blinder-Oaxaca analysis uses the methods of Abadie (2003) 
to identify a linear local average response function for lottery compliers conditional 
on a vector of observable demographic variables,  X i . Specifically, we model causal 
interactions with demographics using the equation
(7)  E ℓ [ Y i |  d 1i >  d 0i ,  d i ,  X i ,  d ij ] =  X i ′ θ ℓ +  ω ℓ  d i +  d i  X i ′  ρ ℓ +  ∑ 
j
 
 
 δ j  d ij , ℓ ∈ {u, n}.
This equation has a causal interpretation because conditional on being a complier, 
treatment status (charter enrollment) is independent of potential outcomes. The 
coefficient vector  ρ ℓ captures heterogeneity in LATEs across demographic groups 
in location ℓ.
Equation (7) generates the following parameterization of the urban/nonurban 
difference in charter school attendance effects:
(8)   τ u −  τ n = ( ω u −  ω n ) +  _ X n ′ ( ρ u −  ρ n ) + ( _ X u ′ −  _ X n ′ ) ρ u ,
where
   
_ X ℓ ≡  E ℓ [ X i |  d 1i >  d 0i ].
The last term in equation (8) captures the part of the urban charter advantage 
explained by differences in demographics. In particular, this term tells us how much 
17 Our working paper compares marginal mean counterfactuals for urban and nonurban compliers in more detail 
(Angrist, Pathak, and Walters 2011).
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urban charter effects are boosted by the observable characteristics of urban compli-
ers. The first two terms capture the component of the urban advantage attributable to 
differences in effects within demographic groups.
Here, as always, Blinder-Oaxaca decompositions can be presented in two ways. 
In this case, the urban/nonurban difference in charter school impact can be decom-
posed with differences in means weighted by nonurban charter effects instead of 
urban. Specifically, we can write
(9)   τ u −  τ n = ( ω u −  ω n ) +  _ X u ′ ( ρ u −  ρ n ) + ( _ X u ′ −  _ X n ′ )  ρ n .
Like equation (8), this expression includes components associated with differences 
in demographics and differences in effectiveness conditional on demographics. The 
last term measures how much more effective nonurban charter schools would be if 
their students were demographically similar to the urban charter population.
We construct these decompositions by estimating
   Y i =  X i ′  θ ℓ +  ω ℓ  d i +  d i  X i ′ ρ ℓ +  ∑ 
j
 
 
 δ j  d ij +  ϵ i 
by 2SLS, separately for urban and nonurban applicants, with first stage for  d i 
(10)   d i =  X i ′  μ ℓ +  π ℓ  Z i +  Z i  X i ′  ζ ℓ +  ∑ 
j
 
 
 κ j  d ij +  η i 
and similar first stages for interaction terms involving  d i . The covariate vector,  X i , 
includes sex, race (white or nonwhite), special education status, free lunch status, 
and dummies for baseline MCAS performance at the advanced, proficient, or needs 
improvement level on math and ELA tests. Complier means for each component of 
X i are estimated using the kappa-weighting procedure described in Abadie (2003).
Blinder-Oaxaca decompositions suggest that favorable demographics enhance 
urban charter effectiveness, but differences in student populations do not fully 
account for the urban charter advantage. This can be seen in Table 7, which shows 
the components of equations (8) and (9) for middle schools. (The nonurban high 
school samples are too small to admit meaningful investigations of effect heteroge-
neity using this approach.) Column 1 shows the difference in charter middle school 
treatment effects by urban status.18 Columns 2 and 3 report the components of 
decomposition (8), which multiplies the urban/nonurban difference in demograph-
ics by treatment effects for urban schools. Column 2 shows how urban effective-
ness might change if urban schools were to serve the nonurban population. These 
results suggest that 51 percent of the urban advantage in math (0.32/0.63) can be 
explained by the level of urban demographics. The corresponding estimate for ELA 
is 47  percent. Urban schools are especially effective for poor and minority students, 
and they serve more of these students than do nonurban schools. On the other hand, 
18 These differences differ slightly from those reported in Table 6 because equation (10) imposes first-stage 
coefficients that are constant across risk sets, while the earlier estimates allow the first stage coefficients to vary.
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column 3 shows that even with the same student mix found at nonurban charter 
schools, urban charters would be more effective than nonurban charters. The urban 
charter advantage can therefore be attributed to a combination of student demo-
graphics and larger treatment effects within demographic groups. As shown in col-
umns 4 and 5, decomposition (9) produces qualitatively similar results, though the 
standard errors for this decomposition are much larger due to the relative impreci-
sion of the estimated  ρ n .
IV. Differences in Schools
Our exploration of school-level heterogeneity in achievement effects builds on 
observational estimates. This provides a larger sample of schools with more varia-
tion in characteristics and practices, and allows us to compare effects for eligible 
charter schools with and without lottery records. The observational estimates use a 
combination of matching and regression to control for observed differences between 
students attending different types of schools. Specifically, students attending lottery-
eligible charters are matched to a control sample with the same baseline school, 
baseline year, sex, and race. Charter students are matched if they fall into a baseline 
school-year-sex-race cell that includes at least one regular public school student; 
likewise, regular public school students are matched if they fall into in a cell that 
includes at least one student in an eligible charter school. Every charter student in 
the matched sample is therefore compared to at least one demographically similar 
student from the same cohort and sending school. This procedure yields matches for 
92 percent of students attending eligible charter schools.
Table 7—Decomposing Differences in Middle School Charter Effects
Decomposition 1  
(urban loading) 
Decomposition 2  
(nonurban loading)
Urban versus 
nonurban 
difference in effects
Due to diffs 
in 
cov. levels
Due to diffs 
in cov. specific 
effects
Due to diffs 
in 
cov. levels
Due to diffs 
in cov. specific 
effects
Subject (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Math 0.633*** 0.322*** 0.312*** 0.250 0.383*
(0.079) (0.075) (0.094) (0.163) (0.200)
N 5,731
ELA 0.389*** 0.184** 0.205** 0.197 0.192
(0.073) (0.077) (0.095) (0.146) (0.180)
N 5,734
notes: This table decomposes the difference between urban and nonurban charter treatment effects. Outcomes are 
test scores the year after the lottery. The treatment is a dummy for charter attendance. Column 1 shows the differ-
ence in urban and nonurban charter treatment effects, computed as described in the text. Columns 2 and 3 report 
the components of the urban/nonurban difference due to differences in covariate levels and differences in covari-
ate-specific effects, weighting the difference in covariate means by the urban treatment effects. Columns 4 and 5 
report a decomposition that weights the difference in means by the nonurban treatment effects. Covariates used in 
the decompositions are race (white versus nonwhite), sex, special education, free/reduced price lunch, and baseline 
score categories (advanced, proficient, needs improvement, warning) in math and ELA.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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The observational analysis is based on the following estimating equation for stu-
dent i from matching cell c, observed in grade g in year t:
(11)   y igtc =  α t +  β g +  μ c +  X i ′ θ +  s igt ′ τ +  ϵ igtc .
Here,  s igt is a vector measuring years spent in each eligible charter school for student 
i from baseline through year t, while  X i is a vector of additional student characteris-
tics including limited English proficiency, special education status, subsidized lunch 
status, and baseline math and ELA scores.19 To validate the observational research 
design, we compared lottery-based and observational results for schools where both 
can be computed. This comparison was encouraging, as the two designs produced 
qualitatively similar estimates for most schools. The results of this validation exer-
cise appear in online Appendix Table A5.20
We link charter school effectiveness to school practices using the following 
school-level regression:
(12)    τs =  ϕ 0 +  ϕ 1 u s +  ϕ 2  l s +  ϕ 3  H s +  p s ′  ϕ 4 +  u s ,
where   τs is an observational estimate of the effect of charter school s from equa-
tion (11),  u s is an urban dummy,  l s is a lottery sample dummy,  H s is a high school 
dummy, and  p s is a vector of practices and characteristics. Observations in this 
regression are weighted by the reciprocal of the standard error of the estimated treat-
ment effect. Standard errors are clustered at the school level to account for the fact 
that some schools contribute both middle and high school estimates to the sample.21
Consistent with the findings reported in Table 4, estimates of equation (12) reveal 
substantially larger treatment effects at urban charter schools. As shown in col-
umns 1 and 5 of Table 8, the urban advantage is roughly 0.21σ in math and 0.12σ 
in ELA. Interestingly, oversubscribed schools with high-quality lottery records also 
seem to be more effective than nonlottery schools; lottery-sample schools generate 
gains that are 0.15σ and 0.11σ larger than the effects of nonlottery schools. This is 
further evidence of the importance of school-level heterogeneity in charter effects.
We next ask whether identification with the No Excuses instructional approach 
accounts for the urban charter advantage. Our focus on No Excuses is motivated 
by strong results for the schools in our study of Boston charters (Abdulkadiro ˘    glu 
et al. 2011), most of which embrace No Excuses pedagogy, and by our results for a 
KIPP school in Lynn, Massachusetts (Angrist et al. 2010, 2012). KIPP is a rapidly 
growing charter management organization (CMO) whose schools are often seen 
as emblematic of the No Excuses approach. Moreover, in 2010 the Massachusetts 
19 These models also control for years spent in ineligible charters and alternative schools.
20 Observational estimates for schools in the urban lottery sample are strikingly similar to the lottery results. The 
match between lottery and observational results for nonurban schools is not as good, with more positive observa-
tional estimates than those generated by lottery methods. This seems unlikely to affect the main conclusions from 
the observational analysis, however.
21 The sample for equation (12) includes all eligible charter schools with data on at least one element of 
p s . Dummies are included to indicate  missing  values for each survey question. The sample used to estimate 
 equation (12) is larger than the sample of surveyed schools in Table 2 because some nonsurveyed schools contribute 
data on the traditional inputs included in  p s .
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legislature passed a law relaxing the state’s charter cap for districts in the lowest 
decile of MCAS performance, and many of the No Excuses schools from our earlier 
study (including KIPP, MATCH, Excel Academy, Edward Brooke, and Roxbury 
Preparatory) have responded to this with proposals for new campuses (Candal 2010).
No Excuses identification explains the relative effectiveness of urban charter 
schools in our sample. This can be seen in columns 2 and 6 of Table 8, which add 
a dummy for No Excuses to equation (12).22 No Excuses charter schools generate 
math and ELA gains that are 0.21σ and 0.15σ larger than the effects of other charters. 
Moreover, conditional on No Excuses status, the estimated urban coefficients are 
small and insignificant, while still precisely estimated. Since no  nonurban charters 
identify with No Excuses, this implies that urban schools that do not identify with No 
22 The No Excuses dummy is constructed from responses to this question: do you see your school as adher-
ing to a particular approach or philosophy, such as no excuses? We retained this measure from the less-detailed 
survey used in our earlier working paper (Angrist, Pathak, and Walters 2011) because of the potential for schools to 
strategically answer the No Excuses question in our new survey in response to our earlier results.
Table 8—Observational Models for Charter Effectiveness
Math ELA
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Urban 0.212*** 0.078 −0.057 −0.008 0.123*** 0.034 −0.025 0.028
(0.049) (0.063) (0.039) (0.058) (0.032) (0.026) (0.033) (0.033)
Lottery 0.152** 0.041 −0.041 0.116** 0.105** 0.060* 0.024 0.069
(0.070) (0.055) (0.032) (0.053) (0.043) (0.033) (0.045) (0.046)
No Excuses — 0.211*** −0.019 0.207*** — 0.150*** 0.038 0.171***
(0.076) (0.051) (0.060) (0.037) (0.038) (0.051)
Discipline and — — 0.293*** — — — 0.107*** —
 comportment (0.062) (0.041)
Uniforms — —  0.071** — — — 0.054* —
(0.034) (0.028)
Cold-calling — — 0.130*** — — — 0.080 —
(0.049) (0.050)
Strict adherence to — — 0.037 — — — −0.014 —
 school-wide  
  standards
(0.027) (0.033)
TFA alumni — — 0.018 — — — 0.021 —
(0.047) (0.055)
Minutes per day/60 — — — 0.027 — — — −0.003
 (0.045) (0.022)
Minutes in — — — 0.131 — — — 0.008
 subject/60  (0.097) (0.051)
PPE/1,000 — — — −0.009 — — — −0.009
 (0.006) (0.009)
Observations 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33
notes: This table shows estimates from regressions of school-specific treatment effects on school characteristics. 
Regressions are weighted by the inverse of the relevant impact standard error. All models include a high school 
dummy and a dummy for middle schools with high school grades. Missing values are included in each regression. 
Standard errors are clustered at the school level.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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Excuses also dramatically reduces the lottery coefficients, and renders lottery status 
statistically insignificant in math, though it remains marginally significant in ELA.
Figure 2 summarizes the relationship between No Excuses practice and charter 
impacts estimated using both observational and lottery-based methods. The lottery 
estimates come from a 2SLS regression that instruments time spent in each lottery-
sample charter with school-specific offers.23 The figure plots school-specific math 
coefficients against the corresponding ELA coefficients, labeling points by school 
type and location. The No Excuses advantage is striking: With few exceptions, esti-
mates for urban No Excuses charters are large and positive in both subjects, while 
the estimates for nonurban schools as well as urban schools not associated with No 
Excuses are small or negative.
A. Inside the No Excuses Black Box
The results reported here suggest that the relative effectiveness of urban lottery 
charter schools is driven by these schools’ embrace of the No Excuses instructional 
approach. We explore this finding further by using our survey results to get inside the 
“black box” of No Excuses effectiveness and ask which elements of the No Excuses 
model are most closely tied to charter impacts. Table 9 lists the full set of practices 
measured by the survey. As described in the online Survey Appendix, many survey 
questions ask respondents to report answers on a four- or five-point scale; we convert 
these to binary indicators equal to one for a top-of-scale response. Column 1 reports 
means, while columns 2, 4, and 6 show coefficients from regressions of No Excuses 
status, and observational estimates of charter effects on each practice variable and a 
high school dummy. Columns 3, 5, and 7 report t-statistics from these regressions.
No Excuses schools are more likely than other Massachusetts charters to empha-
size discipline and comportment, college preparation, and traditional reading and 
math skills. This can be seen in estimates of the relationship between No Excuses 
status and measures of school philosophy, reported in the first two columns of 
panel A in Table 9. In addition, No Excuses schools are unlikely to emphasize social 
and physical well-being or cultural awareness. Panel B reports corresponding results 
for specific school practices. No Excuses schools are likely to use uniforms, to cold-
call in the classroom, to use drills and extended instructional time in math, and to 
use formal reward systems to shape student behavior; they are unlikely to use group 
projects. As shown in panel C, No Excuses charters also tend to hire TFA alumni 
and to videotape lessons to provide teachers with feedback. Moreover, columns 4–7 
of Table 9 show that school characteristics highly correlated with No Excuses status 
also tend to be highly correlated with charter effectiveness.
Our findings here are consistent with results for effective New York charters 
reported by Dobbie and Fryer (2011b), who identify five practices that explain charter 
effectiveness. These are: high expectations, frequent teacher feedback,  high-dosage 
tutoring, increased instructional time, and data-driven instruction. These practices 
23 We also used these lottery estimates to estimate a version of equation 12. The results were qualitatively simi-
lar to the observational estimates reported in Table 8, but the lottery-based analysis was much less precise because 
of the relative imprecision of school-specific lottery estimates.
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tend to be positively correlated with both No Excuses status and charter effective-
ness in our sample. Our measure of discipline and comportment, one of the stron-
gest correlates of No Excuses, is closely related to Dobbie and Fryer’s measure of high 
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Figure 2. School-Specific Treatment Effects
Notes: This figure plots school-specific math effects against school-specific ELA effects. The sample used to con-
struct lottery estimates contains fewer schools than the observational sample.  The figure plots both middle and high 
school estimates.
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expectations.24 Table 9 also shows that No Excuses charters are more likely than other 
charters to observe teachers in the classroom and to use video for feedback, to have 
tutoring programs for all students, and to have run long days and extended school years. 
They also tend to use tests to gauge understanding, suggesting a data-driven approach.
24 Dobbie and Fryer’s expectations variable combines questions measuring “very high expectations for student 
behavior and discipline” and “a relentless focus on academic goals and having students meet them.”
Table 9—Correlates of No Excuses Identification and Charter School Effectiveness
No Excuses Math effect ELA effect
Mean Coefficient t-stat Coefficient t-stat Coefficient t-stat
Characteristic (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
panel A. school philosophy
No Excuses 0.364 — 0.247 4.810 0.145 3.692
Discipline and comportment 0.391 0.660 4.126 0.297 5.944 0.175 4.097
Strict adherence to school-wide  
 standards 
0.565 0.569 3.218 0.236 3.672 0.096 1.790
College preparation 0.783 0.545 2.219 0.272 3.180 0.129 1.927
Traditional reading and  
 math skills 
0.565 0.386 1.929 0.182 2.516 0.039 0.679
Measurable results  
 (achievement gains) 
0.522 0.159 0.718 0.192 2.600 0.075 1.304
Common core values 0.500 0.114 0.513 −0.047 −0.531 −0.103 −1.812
Individually-tailored instruction 0.261 0.016 0.067 0.005 0.059 −0.017 −0.261
STEM 0.682 −0.166 −0.710 0.028 0.341 0.047 0.799
Speech and writing  
 development 
0.478 −0.200 −0.961 −0.018 −0.222 −0.010 −0.175
Qualitative achievement 0.348 −0.279 −1.248 −0.019 −0.214 −0.034 −0.554
Leadership 0.087 −0.429 −1.150 −0.077 −0.527 −0.173 −1.826
Cultural awareness 0.304 −0.473 −2.310 −0.123 −1.463 −0.137 −2.560
Social and physical well-being 0.565 −0.474 −2.480 −0.127 −1.611 −0.103 −1.935
panel B. school practices 
Uniforms 0.708 0.644 3.643 0.225 3.227 0.091 1.623
Cold calling 0.273 0.654 3.590 0.218 2.701 0.121 2.023
Math drills 0.391 0.549 3.014 0.252 4.048 0.106 1.973
Extended math instruction 0.273 0.537 2.639 0.257 3.377 0.121 2.009
Reward system 0.682 0.510 2.492 0.164 1.968 0.048 0.831
Informal tests to gauge  
 understanding 
0.696 0.473 2.310 0.189 2.446 0.037 0.612
College icons in the classroom 0.522 0.439 2.309 0.225 3.494 0.070 1.282
Emphasis on MCAS 0.591 0.432 2.120 0.244 3.634 0.144 2.802
Tutoring for all students 0.348 0.385 1.858 0.201 2.762 0.096 1.719
Days in school year > median 0.435 0.346 1.703 0.094 1.170 0.055 0.972
Minutes in school  
 day > median 
0.348 0.346 1.581 0.192 2.469 0.040 0.658
Student contract 0.696 0.348 1.577 0.132 1.554 0.014 0.219
DEAR or SSR 0.391 0.294 1.417 −0.003 −0.033 −0.034 −0.590
Parent contract 0.696 0.268 1.203 0.107 1.255 0.047 0.776
Extended reading instruction 0.190 0.299 1.120 0.280 3.033 0.139 1.952
Response to intervention  
 for math 
0.182 0.244 0.860 0.213 2.132 0.142 2.012
Reading aloud 0.217 0.204 0.799 0.014 0.142 −0.005 −0.065
Response to intervention  
 for reading 
0.227 0.097 0.370 0.199 2.210 0.115 1.757
Teacher autonomy 0.524 −0.194 −0.887 −0.149 −1.868 −0.093 −1.675
Group projects 0.435 −0.490 −2.663 −0.211 −3.146 −0.121 −2.400
(continued)
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The five variables most correlated with No Excuses status as measured by their 
t-statistics are emphasis on discipline, school uniforms, cold-calling, strict adherence 
to school-wide standards, and the use of TFA alumni. To ask which practices best 
explain the effectiveness of No Excuses charters, we next add these five variables to 
equation (12). Columns 3 and 7 of Table 8 show that, of these five, the variables mea-
suring discipline and school uniforms are most predictive of charter impacts. Schools 
that emphasize discipline and comportment raise achievement in math and ELA by 
0.29σ and 0.11σ more than schools that do not. The use of uniforms is associated 
with increased effectiveness of 0.07σ and 0.05σ. With the inclusion of these practice 
variables, the No Excuses coefficient becomes small and statistically insignificant for 
both subjects. After controlling for key elements of the No Excuses model the No 
Excuses coefficient is hard to interpret. No Excuses practices are typically imple-
mented as a package rather than in isolation, and the five practices included in Table 8 
are likely correlated with other unmeasured features of No Excuses. For example, it 
seems unlikely that the use of uniforms alone raises test scores. The results in Table 8 
suggest that schools embracing key elements of the No Excuses package, in particular 
strict discipline, uniforms, and cold-calling, are especially effective.
Finally, we ask whether more traditional school inputs—including instruction 
time, which is correlated with No Excuses status (see panel B of Table 9)—play a 
role in the No Excuses advantage. Columns 4 and 8 in Table 8 show the results of 
substituting instruction time (minutes per day and in the relevant subject) and per-
pupil expenditures for measures of No Excuses practice in equation (12). These 
variables are often thought to be part of the education production function.25 As 
25 Motivated in part by the long days at successful charter schools, the Massachusetts legislature recently autho-
rized a pilot program to extend the school day by two hours in some traditional public schools (Pennington 2007). 
No Excuses Math effect ELA effect
Mean Coefficient t-stat Coefficient t-stat Coefficient t-stat
Characteristic (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
panel c. Teacher profile
TFA alumni 0.261 0.691 3.062 0.202 2.145 0.118 1.736
Lessons videotaped 0.565 0.490 2.663 0.201 2.940 0.113 2.201
MATCH teacher residency 0.143 0.545 1.877 0.244 2.383 0.138 1.821
At-will hiring 0.304 0.349 1.606 0.056 0.647 0.040 0.654
TFA novices 0.174 0.352 1.309 0.068 0.643 0.020 0.262
Observations on new teachers  
 per month 
1.717 0.122 1.022 0.053 1.169 0.029 0.908
Observations on veteran  
 teachers per month 
1.293 0.077 0.586 0.041 0.815 0.002 0.066
Recent college graduates 0.136 −0.323 −1.017 −0.127 −1.036 −0.131 −1.607
Observations 27 27 27
Notes: This table reports coefficients from regressions of a No Excuses dummy and school-specific observational 
estimates of treatment effects on a high school dummy and school practices (one regression per practice). Within 
each panel, characteristics are sorted by strength of relationship with No Excuses identification. The survey ques-
tions appear in the online survey Appendix.
Table 9—Correlates of No Excuses Identification and Charter School Effectiveness (continued)
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it turns out, however, these traditional inputs are unrelated to variation in charter 
school  treatment effects and do little to account for the No Excuses advantage.
Our results suggest that No Excuses practices are a key driver of charter school 
effectiveness, and that discipline may be an especially important contributor. We 
might therefore expect to see a marked impact on disciplinary outcomes in urban 
charter schools. We used a 2SLS strategy paralleling our achievement analysis 
to investigate the effects of charter attendance on suspensions, truancy, and total 
days attended. This analysis revealed large effects of urban charters on discipline 
and attendance. Specifically, urban charter attendance is estimated to increase 
suspensions by 0.7 days in middle school and more than a full day in high school, 
effects that exceed mean suspension rates in the lottery sample (the full set of dis-
cipline results is reported in online Appendix Table A6). Estimates for both middle 
and high school show significant increases in out-of-school suspensions, and smaller 
(but still substantial) increases in in-school suspensions. In contrast, estimates for 
nonurban charter schools show little effect on discipline.26 These results sharpen the 
distinction between urban and nonurban charters. Attendance at urban No Excuses 
charter schools produces large effects on discipline as well as achievement; atten-
dance at other charter schools has little effect in either domain.
V. Conclusions
Massachusetts’ urban charter schools generate impressive achievement gains, 
while nonurban charters are largely ineffective and appear to reduce achievement for 
some. Candidate explanations for this constellation of findings include the fact that 
urban charter schools serve larger shares of minority students in districts where the 
surrounding achievement level is generally low, keep their students in school lon-
ger, spend more money per pupil, and are much more likely to identify with the No 
Excuses instructional approach than are nonurban schools. Our analysis examines the 
contribution of these student- and school-level factors to the urban charter advantage.
Massachusetts’ urban charter schools, including the oversubscribed schools at the 
heart of our lottery analysis, serve a typical urban population characterized by low 
test scores and high poverty rates. On average, urban charters push their students well 
beyond the achievement levels characteristic of urban public school districts, while 
nonurban charter schools leave their students’ achievement unchanged or diminished 
from a higher starting point. Urban charter schools are most effective for minorities, 
poor students, and low baseline achievers, so part of the urban charter advantage can 
be explained by student demographics. On the other hand, nonurban charter schools 
fail to show clear gains for any group; the urban advantage would likely remain were 
nonurban students more like those found in cities. Our analysis also reveals impor-
tant heterogeneity within the set of urban schools. Over-subscribed schools with 
well-documented admissions processes are more effective than other urban charters.
Per-pupil expenditure is of longstanding interest to researchers and policymakers; increasing per-pupil expenditure 
is sometimes seen as an alternative to structural reforms (Hanushek 1997).
26 Both urban and nonurban charters appear to increase days of attendance, though estimates here are smaller 
for nonurban charters.
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Our analysis of the relationship between school characteristics and treatment 
effects suggests that adherence to the No Excuses paradigm can account for both 
the urban and lottery-sample charter advantages. To get inside the black box of No 
Excuses, we  collected data on school practices. No Excuses schools are more likely 
to use strict discipline and require uniforms, to cold-call in the classroom, and to 
hire alumni of the Teach for America program. Consistent with a No Excuses expla-
nation of the urban charter advantage, the large achievement gains generated by 
urban charter schools are mirrored by substantial effects on disciplinary outcomes 
in the urban sample.
Our negative estimates for nonurban charter middle schools raise the question 
of why, despite their unimpressive achievement effects, many of these schools are 
oversubscribed. One possibility is that parents misjudge the consequences of non-
urban charter attendance. In a study of school choice, Rothstein (2006) argues that 
parental choice is driven primarily by levels of peer achievement rather than school 
effectiveness. Of course, nonurban charter schools may generate gains on dimen-
sions that nonurban families value more than the skills measured by the MCAS, 
especially in view of the fact that most nonurban students do reasonably well in any 
case. Still, it seems unlikely that most nonurban parents would welcome a deteriora-
tion in basic skills. In ongoing work, we’re studying other outcomes in an effort to 
determine whether the heterogeneous findings for achievement reported here have 
longer term consequences. Preliminary results show positive effects of Boston’s 
charter high schools on SAT scores and four-year college attendance, suggesting 
that the effects of urban charter attendance are persistant (Angrist et al. 2013).
Finally, it’s worth noting that the charter school effect heterogeneity documented 
here is relevant to the ongoing debate over charter expansion in Massachusetts and 
elsewhere. Many states cap the number of charter schools, and the US Department of 
Education is pressing states to lift these caps. The 2010 law relaxing Massachusetts’ 
cap gives priority to “proven providers” who have previously operated schools 
deemed to be successful (Candal 2010). Our methods show how a distinction 
between effective and ineffective charters can be grounded in rigorous empirical 
analysis, while our results suggest that charter expansion policies favoring operators 
and pedagogical models with documented effectiveness increase the likelihood that 
charters will reduce achievement gaps.
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